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This dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay investigates the impact of 
capital account convertibility on the volatility of economic growth. Previous work has 
concentrated on the impact of convertibility on mean growth and has found 
contradictory results. Existing theoretical work suggests that impact of convertibility 
on volatility could differ across economies depending on their level of financial 
development. I test this hypothesis using a system of equations that allow for 
simultaneous determination of three endogenous variables: volatility, mean growth 
and financial development. I also allow for spillover effects in economic growth and 
its volatility. I find that financially developed economies are better able to handle 
capital account convertibility in the sense that convertibility does not lead to excess 
fluctuations in those economies. However less financially developed economies 
suffer a higher level of fluctuations with an open capital account. These results are 
robust to alternative measures of financial development and to removal of the top and 
bottom 10% of my sample. I also find significant spillovers from growth of trade 
partners on the mean growth of the domestic economy.  
  
The second essay builds on Romer's (1994) idea that when there are fixed costs of 
entry into export markets, even low trade barriers can lead to the complete 
disappearance of some products and impose costs that are much larger than the 
conventional costs of protection. I incorporate Romer's insight into a fully specified 
general equilibrium model. In a two-country, differentiated goods model, assuming 
that firms are heterogeneous with respect to the costs of entry into the export market, 
I show that firms are divided into those that sell exclusively at home and those that 
also sell abroad.  Larger firms export more and are also characterized by higher 
average productivity.  The cost of protection is significantly higher when I allow 
products to disappear as a result of the tariff. My work is closely related to Melitz 
(2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2002) but differs in the mechanism 
underlying the results. Data from the Indian trade liberalization of the 1990s appears 
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Chapter 1: Ready for Capital Account Convertibility? 
 
Section 1 - Introduction 
Empirical investigation of capital account liberalization has concentrated on its 
impact on mean growth and has yielded conflicting results. Rodrik (1998) found that 
capital account liberalization has an insignificant effect on growth rates. He used the 
International Monetary Fund indicator to measure capital account openness. Quinn 
(1997) constructed and used a more nuanced measure of capital controls in his study 
and found a significant positive impact of having a more open capital account. 
Edwards (2001) used the Quinn measure and found that having a liberal capital 
account regime has a positive impact in rich countries but a negative impact in poor 
countries.  
 
Theoretical literature and anecdotal evidence, however, suggest another important 
route through which capital account convertibility impacts an economy - volatility. In 
this paper I test the hypothesis that the impact of capital account liberalization on the 
volatility of economic growth depends on the level of financial development of the 
economy.  
 
This paper goes beyond previous studies in four important ways. First it studies the 
impact of capital account liberalization on volatility of economic growth. Second, it 




uses three simultaneous equations, one each for volatility, economic growth and 
financial development, thus allowing explicitly for two-way links between these 
variables. Fourth, it allows international spillover effects to impact the domestic 
economy.  
 
Capital Account Controls are the element of the external sector regime of a country 
that govern it in international financial markets. Controls on current payments and 
transfers and trade restrictions constitute the other elements of this regime and govern 
the country in international markets for goods and services.  
Capital controls include restrictions relating to:  
a. repatriation and surrender of proceeds from exports, invisibles and current 
transfers, 
b. purchase and sale of capital and money market instruments,  
c. derivatives and other instruments,  
d. commercial and financial credit operations,  
e. outward and inward direct foreign investment,  
f. foreign and domestic real estate transactions,  
g. liquidation of direct investment and  
h. provision for commercial banks, other credit institutions and institutional investors. 
 
Removing these restrictions allows capital to move freely into and out of a country, 




The history of international capital flows dates back to the 19th century, when the 
global capital market linked financial centers all over the world (Obstfeld, 1998). 
However most of these flows were inhibited after the two World Wars and the Great 
Depression. The current round of capital account liberalization dates back to the 
sixties in some industrialized countries and the early seventies in parts of the 
developing world. Table VI presents a time-line of liberalization in selected 
developing countries, as per the International Monetary Fund indicator of capital 
account openness. 
 
There are several potential benefits of capital mobility. It allows allocation of 
resources to the most productive use; investors are able to diversify their portfolios 
and earn a higher risk adjusted rate of return; and investible funds are made available 
in developing countries. There is also evidence to suggest that international financial 
liberalization provides previously lacking incentives for accelerated reforms of 
domestic financial markets and institutions, especially in developing countries 
(Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002). Moreover, since capital flows are sensitive to 
macroeconomic policies and to the health of the banking system, capital markets tend 
to enforce discipline (Fischer, 1998). 
 
At the same, there is a downside to liberalization. Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2001) 
investigate the impact of financial liberalization (domestic and external) on 
macroeconomic variables and find that most of the benefits of liberalization occur 




volatility. It has been argued that, due to lack of information or lack of incentive for 
gathering information, foreign investors in emerging markets exhibit herd behavior. 
This leads to very volatile movements of capital across borders, where these 
movements are not necessarily related to economic fundamentals, resulting in real 
damage to the domestic economy (Calvo, 1996). Another reason for volatile capital 
flows is spillover effects, for example, via common lenders (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999). In this case, a country experiences capital outflows as loans are called back by 
lenders that have also lent to countries that are in crisis. These lenders need to 
rebalance their portfolio and recapitalize. Countries that borrowed predominantly 
from Japanese commercial banks are an example of a common bank creditor cluster. 
This particular cluster included Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, China and Korea. The 
evidence in the Kaminsky and Reinhart paper suggests that this sort of financial link 
might have been important in spreading the contagion.  
 
Aghion et. al. (2000) present a theoretical model which produces a differential impact 
of capital account liberalization based on the level of financial development. In their 
model of a small open economy with credit constrained firms, as the capital account 
is opened, higher investment, output and profits result as capital flows in. The credit 
constraint is of the form that firms can borrow a maximum of µ  times their current 
wealth. With higher profits, borrowing capacity improves and leads to higher 
investment. Subsequently however, input prices are bid up leading to lower profits 
and lower borrowing capacity. This results in lower output. An economy with a low 




development (high µ ) there is no volatility as firms' investment is not constrained by 
their current wealth and so the shock to their cash flow resulting from higher prices of 
the country specific factor does not impact their investment or output.  
 
Others such as Paasche (2001) have emphasized how credit constraints play a role in 
amplifying the impact of terms of trade shocks in an open economy. Cespedes, Chang 
and Velasco (2000) show that financial frictions strongly magnify adverse foreign 
shocks through the presence of balance sheet effects.  
 
The liberalization of capital accounts has been one of the major factors in the surge of 
capital flows into emerging markets. At the same time, most of the countries that have 
experienced rather large inflows compared to the relative size of their capital stock 
have also subsequently suffered huge capital flow reversals (Bacchetta & Wincoop, 
2000). Emerging markets seem to be different in the way that they react to external 
financial liberalization compared to markets in developed countries. 
 
In my empirical model, I specifically account for differences in the level of financial 
development. I formally test the hypothesis that differences in financial development 
lead to different impacts of capital account liberalization. 
 
The model uses a system of equations that allow for simultaneous determination of 




also allows for spillover effects in economic growth and its volatility from major 
trade partners of each country. 
 
The reason for using a system of three equations is that estimating a single equation  
for volatility would not allow me to account for the joint determination of growth, 
volatility and financial development. There exists theoretical and empirical work that 
suggests a positive relationship between economic growth and financial development 
(King and Levine 1993, Patrick 1966, Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990 and 
Greenwood and Smith 1997). There also exists literature to suggest that volatility has 
a negative impact on growth (Ramey and Ramey 1995, Mobarak 2001) and might in 
turn be influenced by it. An instance of the latter is the potential positive influence of 
growth on political stability (Londeregan and Poole 1989). The volatility equation 
that I seek to estimate is thus interrelated with other equations in the more complete 
model. Therefore, I estimate a set of three simultaneous equations. 
 
Also I account for spillover effects of volatility and growth in other countries.  
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001) use crisis episodes to compare trade and financial 
linkages as channels for the spread of contagion. In this paper I consider bilateral 
trade as a channel for spillover effects. I weight the importance of the spillover from 
any economy to the domestic economy based on its share in the trade of the domestic 
economy. Thus the weighted average of the volatility and growth of countries that 
rank among the top 20 major trading partners of a country enter as explanatory 




equations, we instrument for them using their lag, populations of the two trading 
countries normalized by the total population of the world, lagged gross domestic 
product of the two trading countries normalized by the total gross domestic product of 
the world and the physical distance between them normalized by the longest distance 
in my sample. This is in the spirit of gravity models, where the size of the two trading 
partners determines the trade between them. The use of the instrumental variables 
approach in this context follows the procedure suggested in Kelejian and Prucha 
(2002). The fact that trade shares might be endogenous has been largely ignored in 
the past literature (Moreno and Trehan - JEG, 1997) 
 
I find that in the volatility equation there is some evidence for a differential effect of 
capital account openness. The interaction term between financial development and 
capital account liberalization itself has a significant negative coefficient. This 
suggests that higher financial development helps an economy to handle capital 
account convertibility better in the sense that convertibility does not lead to excessive 
fluctuations. I also find that growth spillovers from major trade partners are a 
significant influence on the mean growth of an economy. These results are robust to 
alternative measures of financial development and to the removal of the top and 
bottom 10% countries in terms of per capita Gross Domestic Product of my sample. 
 
Section 2 - Literature Review 
This paper relates to empirical and theoretical work in a number of closely related 




In a model of a small open economy Aghion et al. (2000) find that in economies at an 
intermediate level of financial development, full financial liberalization in the sense 
of opening the domestic market to foreign capital flows may destabilize the economy. 
Other theoretical models also yield similar implications. In a three-country model 
Paasche (2001) shows that if financial frictions are present, a temporary terms of 
trade shock can be amplified by credit constraints. In Cespedes, Chang and Velasco 
(2000) the impact of an adverse foreign shock can be strongly magnified by balance 
sheet effects that arise in the presence of financial constraints. In the context of a 
closed economy, Bernanke & Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki & Moore (1987) model the 
persistence of shocks due to credit constraints. 
 
In this paper I formally test the hypothesis that capital account convertibility leads to 
higher volatility in less financially developed economies. This implication is derived 
from the models outlined above, where low levels of financial development lead to 
high volatility if there are shocks. The reason for this is that if shocks impact net 
worth and producers are more credit constrained at lower levels of financial 
development because their borrowing capacity is closely linked to their current net 
worth, excessive fluctuations in investment and growth could develop. My empirical 
model allows for simultaneous determination of volatility, economic growth and 






I now outline the literature that suggests to these linkages. In cross-country data, 
Ramey and Ramey (AER 1995) find that countries with higher volatility have lower 
average growth. Thus volatility and growth are closely linked. There is also a 
literature on the two-way relationship between growth and financial development. 
King and Levine (QJE 1993) present cross country evidence that financial 
development is strongly associated with growth. They use four different indicators of 
financial development.  
 
In this paper I use credit to the private sector as a percentage of gross domestic 
product as my measure of financial development. This is one of the measures used by 
King and Levine. I use this measure primarily because it accounts for one of the most 
important function of the financial sector, channeling savings into the productive 
sectors of the economy. I test the sensitivity of my results to the use of other measures 
of financial development. The sensitivity tests are discussed in greater detail in 
Section 8. My results are quite robust to use of other measures of financial 
development. 
 
Hugh Patrick (EDCC 1966) discusses the causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. He emphasizes both the ''demand-following'' 
phenomenon, in which evolutionary development of the financial system is a 
continuing consequence of the process of economic development, and the ''supply-
leading'' phenomenon, in which the creation of financial institutions and supply of 




of demand for them. The latter serves as an opportunity to induce real growth by 
financial means. Thus financial development and growth are closely linked. 
 
Research on the impact of capital account convertibility on growth has produced 
conflicting results. Dani Rodrik (1998) finds no empirical association between capital 
account liberalization and growth in his cross-country study. Using the binary (0-1) 
indicator constructed by the International Monetary Fund to measure capital account 
restrictions he regresses average growth of Gross Domestic Product per capita on a 
number of independent variables including the fraction of years for which the capital 
account was free of restrictions. Meanwhile Quinn (1997) finds a positive significant 
correlation between capital account liberalization and economic growth. He 
constructs a more nuanced measure of capital account openness. For 56 countries 
over the period 1950 to 1994 and an additional 8 countries starting in 1954, Quinn 
distinguishes 2 categories of statutory measures that represent capital account 
restrictions. For both these categories, Quinn codes the intensity of controls on a two 
point scale(where the values increase at half point increments from 0 to 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 
with 0 denoting most intense and 2 denoting no restrictions). This produces an index 
of capital account restrictions that ranges from 0 to 4. The differences in the findings 
of these studies could stem from differences in the countries and the years included in 
the sample, as well as the manner in which capital account restrictions are measured. 
Edwards (2001), using the Quinn measure of capital controls, finds that capital 
account liberalization boosted growth in 1980s in high-income countries but slowed it 





I use the International Monetary Fund measure of capital account openness since the 
Quinn measure is publicly available for only three years of my sample (one in the mid 
70s and two in the 80s). 
 
I study the effect of capital account convertibility not only on growth, but also on 
volatility. Among existing work on the determinants of volatility, Easterly et al 
(2000) find that a deeper financial system is significantly associated with less 
volatility and that the relationship is nonlinear. Denizer et al (2000) find that countries 
with more developed financial sectors experience less fluctuation in real per capita 
output, consumption and investment growth. Both these studies regress volatility as 
measured by (standard deviation of per capita gross domestic product growth rates), 
against a range of independent variables. The Denizer et al (2000) study also 
examines the volatility of consumption and investment growth. 
 
With the exception of Mobarak (2001), most previous work has studied growth, 
financial development and volatility separately. My work takes the logical next step 
in this literature by allowing for simultaneous determination of growth, volatility and 
financial development. I provide a framework for testing empirically the idea that 
capital account convertibility might have differential effects on economies depending 
on their stage of financial development, and I test for effects of capital account 
convertibility not only through its direct effect on growth but also through its 





I also study other sources of influence that the international economy has on the 
domestic economy via trade openness and spillover effects from growth and volatility 
of trade partner countries. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001) explore financial and trade 
linkages among nations as channels of contagion. In this paper I test for spillovers 
through the bilateral trade channel. My empirical framework can also be easily used 
to account for other channels. Easterly and Levine (1994) use a weighting matrix 
based on total gross domestic product of neighboring countries to account for growth 
spillover effects in Africa. They instrument for their spillover weights using policy 
variables. Moreno and Trehan (JEG, 1997) use a weighting matrix of distances to 
study growth spillovers. They also use trade weighted spillover effects, but they fail 
to take into account the endogeniety of trade shares and do not instrument for them. 
In this study I account for spillover effects on the domestic economy's growth and 
volatility arising from growth and the volatility of the country's top 20 trade partners. 
The weighting matrix consists of trade shares of the partner countries in the total trade 
(exports + imports) of the domestic economy. I instrument the weighting matrix of 
trade shares using lagged trade shares, the populations of the two trading countries 
normalized by the total world population, their lagged gross domestic product 
normalized by the total gross domestic product of the world and the physical distance 
between them normalized by the longest distance in the sample. This is in the spirit of 





Section 3 - The Derivation of the Empirical Model 
The empirical model consists of three equations; one each for economic growth, 
financial development and volatility. 
 
The volatility equation is derived from intuition built on a number of theoretical 
models. The main aim here is to test for differential influence of capital account 
convertibility on the volatility of an economy depending on its level of financial 
development. The volatility equation controls for the standard variables accounted for 
in the literature. This study is concerned specifically with the impact of the degree of 
openness to the international economy. Thus it additionally looks for the influence of 
capital account convertibility and an interaction term between capital account 
convertibility and financial development. The aforementioned model of Aghion et al. 
(2000) suggests that the impact of capital account liberalization will diminish as 









K = Level of capital account openness (higher values represent more openness) 
F  = Level of financial development (higher values represent higher financial 
development)  







The equation that I estimate for volatility is 
titittititititititti XVWGKFFKV ,16,1.,,5,4,,3,2,10, )](*)[( εαααααααα ++++++++=  
Where tiV ,  is the standard deviation of the growth rate of the gross domestic product 
per capita of country i in decade t, tiK ,  is a measure of capital account openness, tiF ,  
is a measure of financial development, tiG ,  is the growth rate of gross domestic 
product per capita, and tiX ,1  contains other determinants of volatility, which are listed 







.,,  is a weighted average of volatilities of 
the major trading partners of country i in period t, where the weights ( ijw ) are the 
trade shares of the major trading partners of the country. This term allows me to test 
for spillover effects via the trade channel. If the volatility increasing impact of capital 
market openness is lower at higher levels of financial development, we would expect 
to find 3α <0. 
 
To complete the model and account for important interlinks, I also estimate equations 
for growth and financial development. 
 
The financial development equation is based mostly on the work of Patrick (1966), 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Greenwood and Smith (1997). 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) model financial development and economic growth 
as being endogenously determined. Growth makes costly financial structures 




return to be earned on capital. In Greenwood and Smith (1997), the date when the 
financial markets start functioning is determined by gains from specialization (which 
are allowed to be random), the probability distribution of costs of market formation 
and the initial wealth of the economy. The higher the expected gains from 
specialization and initial wealth, and the lower the costs of market formation, and 
lower the uncertainty regarding the costs, the sooner the financial market begins 
functioning. No other aspects of the distribution of gains from specialization enter 
into determining financial development in this model. Patrick (1966) analyzes both 
the demand following and supply leading roles of financial development in the 
economic growth process. In the former role financial development responds to 
demand for financial services that results from economic development. According to 
Patrick, rapid growth induces financial development, as does greater dispersion 
among growth rates of different sectors : 
 
“…with a given aggregate growth rate, the greater the variance in the growth rates 
among different sectors or industries, the greater will be the need for financial 
intermediation to transfer savings to fast growing industries from slow-growing 
industries and from individuals. The financial system can thus support and sustain the 
leading sectors in the process of growth… '' 
 
The following equation is estimated for financial development, 




Where tiF ,  is a measure of financial development of country i in decade t and tiX ,3  
contains other determinants of financial development gleaned from the theoretical 
work cited above. Economic growth is included as a proxy for gains from 
specialization, initial gross domestic product per capita is included as a proxy of the 
initial wealth of the economy and the (log of) sectoral dispersion of growth rates is 
included as a measure of the incentive for financial development as per the Patrick 
(1966) argument quoted above. This equation also includes a lag of financial 
development, since one could reasonably expect the level of financial development 
would display persistence. Capital account openness is included as an explanatory 
variable, since international financial liberalization can provide previously lacking 
incentives for accelerated reform aiding development of the financial sector 
(Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002). 
 
The growth equation is estimated as 
titittititititti XGWVFKG ,25,2.,,4,3,2,10,   εβββββββ +++++++=  
where tti GW .,,  represents the weighted average of per capita gross domestic product 
growth rates of the major trading partners of country i, and tiX ,2 contains other 
determinants of growth, including initial (beginning of the decade) gross domestic 
product per capita, initial inflation, initial openness to trade, an index of democracy, 
the black market premium as a proxy for the extent of government intervention, 
revolutions and coups per year as a measure of political stability, the mean and 
standard deviation of terms of trade changes, the log of population, the standard 




and a measure of human capital. These are the standard explanatory variables from 
the growth literature. 
 
Section 4 – The Empirical Model 
I estimate a simultaneous equations model. The equation that is most important and 
central to my investigation is the volatility equation. However it is not sufficient to 
only estimate the volatility equation, since there are other important links that exist. It 
is widely held that growth and financial development are simultaneously determined 
and interact with each other in important ways. Also since we are primarily interested 
in explaining volatility, and the latter is believed to influence and be influenced by 
growth, it is important to account for this link. Therefore, I estimate three equations 
simultaneously, one each for growth, volatility and financial development. I allow for 
spillover effects of growth and volatility of important trade partners on the domestic 
economy's growth and volatility, respectively. 
 
Thus the model to be estimated is 













titittititititti XGWVFKG ,25,2.,,4,3,2,10,   εβββββββ +++++++=    (2) 
titititititti XGKFF ,34,3,3,21,10, εγγγγγγ ++++++= −                      (3) 
where 
tiG , = mean annual growth rate of real gross domestic product per capita in country i 




t = 1 for the decade 1970-79 
 t = 2 for the decade 1980-89 
 t = 3 for the decade 1990-99 
tiV , = volatility (standard deviation) of the growth rate in country i during the decade t. 
tiF ,  = a measure of average financial development of country i in decade t. tiF ,   is 
measured as the average of the ratio of credit to the private sector, over gross 
domestic product in decade t. Credit to the private sector refers to financial resources 
provided to the private sector - such as through loans, purchases of non-equity 
securities, trade credit and other accounts receivables - that establish a claim for 
repayment. 
 
tiK ,  = an index of the existence of capital controls for country i, constructed as the 
average annual International Monetary Fund (IMF) dummy (0-1) over decade t. The 
index is re-scaled such that zero signifies the most controls and unity the least. The 
data for this index comes from the IMF's annual reports on exchange arrangements 
and exchange restrictions. Countries with capital controls are those that the IMF 
classifies as having ''restrictions on payments for capital transactions''. 
 
1X , 2X , 3X  are vectors of independent explanatory variables. All three vectors 
include initial (start of the decade) gross domestic product per capita, initial inflation, 
initial trade openness measured as the sum of exports and imports divided by gross 
domestic product, a democracy index such that zero signifies the least democratic 




the average annual number of coups and revolutions, the average gini coefficient of 
income inequality, the average growth rate of terms of trade, the standard deviation of 
the growth rate of terms of trade, the standard deviation of inflation and the log of 
population. 
 
In addition 1X  through 3X  each contain variables excluded from the other 
regressions, in order to identify the model. 1X  contains a dummy variable for 
diversified exporters, which equals one if the country is diversified in its export base 
and zero if it isn't. If no single category of exports accounts for 50 % or more of total 
exports, the economy is classified as diversified. The categories considered are: 
nonfuel primary (SITC 0, 1, 2, 4, plus 68), fuels (SITC 3), manufactures (SITC 5 to 9, 
less 68), and services (factor and nonfactor service receipts plus workers' 
remittances). The measure of diversification is included only in the volatility equation 
since while diversification reduces volatility, it does not necessarily have a direct 
impact on growth except through the channel of volatility itself (Mobarak, 2001). 
Also the measure of diversification does not appear in the financial development 
equation, because the more relevant measure - the measure of dispersion of growth 
rates across sectors - is accounted for in that equation. This is because while 
diversification per se might not influence financial development, the higher 
dispersion of growth rates among sectors of the economy would lead to higher 





2X  contains the initial investment to gross domestic product ratio and enrollment at 
the secondary education level. The measures of investment and education are 
included in the growth equation alone since both would directly impact growth, while 
no such clear relationship can be drawn with respect to volatility. It would be safe to 
assume that the influence of these two variables would enter into the determination of 
volatility via growth. The financial development equation is primarily derived from 
the intuition of the models of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Greenwood and 
Smith (1997). In both, financial development is determined by (and in turn 
determines) economic growth. As long as growth enters the financial development 
equation, the determinants of growth itself can be assumed to influence financial 
development primarily through the route of growth itself. 
 
3X  contains the log of average annual dispersion of growth rates among sectors 
(agriculture, industry and services). A higher dispersion of growth rates among 
sectors of the economy indicates higher demand for financial intermediation that 
would tend to lead to higher financial development (Patrick 1966). It appears 
therefore only in the financial development equation. In as far as higher dispersion 
might indicate the level of economic development and thus influence growth rates, 
the level of initial gross domestic product per capita is already included in the growth 
equation and is accounting for the stage of economic development. Also the 
relationship between dispersion of growth rates across sectors and volatility is not 
clear-cut. While Lilien (1982) concludes that allocative shocks lead to aggregate 




results indicate that aggregate shocks are the main driving force behind aggregate 
fluctuations. In this paper therefore I assume that dispersion of growth rates across 
sectors does not have direct links to volatility. 
 
tW  is an N X N weighting matrix that consists of average trade shares, over the 
decade, of the top 20 trading partners of each country in the sample. The ith row 
corresponds to trade shares of the ith country with its major trade partners. The ith 
row will have a zero as its ith element since no country is considered its own trade 
partner, and also zeroes corresponding to the countries that are not major trade 
partners of country i. Therefore, tW  serves as a selector matrix. 
 
Table III lists the expected coefficient signs. 
 
Section 5 – Estimation 
The model presented in the previous section is estimated by 3 stage least squares. 
This allows us to use the links between the endogenous variables in the system 
efficiently. The endogenous variables in the model are growth, its volatility, financial 
development, the interaction term of financial development and capital account 
openness. Also the spatial lags of growth ttGW  and volatility ttVW  are endogenous 
(see appendix A for discussion). 
 
In principle the independent explanatory variables ( 1X , 2X , 3X and the index of 




and WX , XW 2 , XW 3 , XW 4 , XW 5 ,…., XW m   and can potentially be used to 
instrument for the endogenous variables of the model. One might consider 
instruments that are nonlinear in the elements of X because of the non-linearities in 
the model. In addition these non-linearities might also proxy for other exogenous 
variables for which we do not have data.  I set q=1 and m=1 in my estimation. 
Appendix A discusses the instruments that involve WX and higher powers of W 
interacted with X. 
 
However in my case an added complication is the fact that the weighting matrix tW  
itself is endogenous, since one could reasonably expect a two way relationship 
between trade and growth. Thus unlike other works in the literature, I cannot use 
tX and tt XW as instruments for ttVW  ( the spatial lag of volatility) and ttGW  ( the 
spatial lag of growth). I use the instrumental variables approach suggested by 
Kelejian and Prucha (2002) to handle the problem of the endogenous weighting 
matrix. The procedure is as follows. First we get a predicted value of the weighting 
matrix tW , say tŴ . Then we use tX and tt XŴ  as instruments in the 3 stage least 
squares procedure. More specifically, we assume a reduced form type model: 
tijtjtiijtjtitijtij YYDPPww ,1,1,,,1,, ηθφςδγβα +++++++= −−−  (4) 
for all tijw , >0  
where tijw , is the ij th nonzero element of tW ; tnP , is the population of country n in 
period t, normalized by the world population in period t ; ijD is the distance in 




the lagged gross domestic product of country n, normalized by the total world gross 
domestic product; and tij ,η  is the disturbance term. This equation is in the spirit of the 
gravity models in the trade literature, where trade between two countries is 
determined by the size of their respective economies and the distance between them. 
The model in (4) is estimated by OLS and the fitted value tijw ,ˆ is obtained, which 
produces tŴ . Then tX and tt XŴ are used as instruments in the subsequent 3SLS 
procedure. 
 
Section 6 – Data 
My data includes about 60 countries over 4 decades, i.e., 1960 through to 1999. A 
major source of the data used in this paper is the World Development Indicators 
database of the World Bank. The Direction of Trade data set of the International 
Monetary Fund was used to extract trade shares in order to construct the weights used 
in the spatial lags of growth and its volatility. The Freedom House index of political 
and civil liberties was used to construct the democracy index used in my analysis. 
The index is available from the Freedom House website (www.freedomhouse.org/ 
ratings). The gini coefficient of inequality was obtained from the Deininger and 
Squire data set, which is available on the World Bank website (http:// 
www.worldbank.org/ research/ growth/ dddeisqu.htm). 
 
The dummy variables for 'fixed characteristics', such as the dummy for diversified 
exporters, were extracted from the Network Growth database of the World Bank. This 




research/ growth/ GDNdata.htm). This is also the source for the black market 
premium in exchange rate markets and the data on revolutions. The latter data is 
originally taken from the Arthur S. Banks database. 
 
Table II provides a comprehensive list of all the variables in the study and their 
sources. 
 
Section 7 – Results 
Table IV presents results from estimating equations (1)-(3). I find that capital account 
liberalization increases volatility significantly, while the interaction between financial 
development and capital account liberalization dampens it. This suggests the presence 
of a differential effect of capital account liberalization, where countries with high 
financial development liberalizing their capital account may not experience the 
increased volatility that a less financially developed country would. 
 
The magnitude of the coefficients indicates that the volatility increasing impact of 
capital account liberalization is completely dampened in countries with a ratio of 
private credit to gross domestic product of roughly 49% or above. To put that result 
into some perspective, the average private credit to gross domestic product ratio in 
my sample of countries was approximately 29%, 38% and 44% in the decades of the 
1970s, 80s and 90s respectively. Countries that had an average private credit to gross 




90s, include Australia, Belgium, Chile, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and the United Kingdom. 
 
A high credit to gross domestic product ratio and a high standard deviation of terms 
of trade changes increase volatility. The latter finding is in accordance with the 
Mendoza (1995) model, where terms-of-trade shocks contribute substantially to Gross 
Domestic Product variability. A more democratic society and higher population 
dampen volatility. There are a number of reasons to expect democracy to reduce 
volatility (Mobarak, 2001). Democracy serves as an institution of conflict 
management, while an autocratic regime is like a risky investment since there is a 
chance of ending up with a bad dictator instead of a benevolent one, policies too tend 
to have larger variance in a dictatorship than in a democracy since in a democracy 
policies are chosen by consensus, while if leaders choose their successors from a 
small pool, the variance of the quality of leaders tends to be higher. Population is a 
measure of diversification and thus it has a negative impact on volatility. All other 
coefficients in the volatility regression have the expected signs. 
 
Financial development varies positively with its lag, initial gross domestic product 
per capita, capital account openness, economic growth and an equitable distribution 
of income. Higher dispersion of sectoral growth rates also has a significant positive 
impact on financial development. These findings correspond closely to the theoretical 




Greenwood and Smith 1997) used to motivate the empirical equation for financial 
development. 
 
The growth equation yields the standard results of the literature. The coefficient of 
initial gross domestic product per capita is negative and significant, and so are the 
coefficients on democracy and the black market premium in currency exchange, 
which is a composite measure of government policy. The coefficient of initial gross 
domestic product is consistent with the convergence prediction of neoclassical growth 
models, which is based on the assumption of diminishing returns to reproducible 
capital and implies that poor countries tend to grow faster than rich ones. Democratic 
institutions may have certain inherent inefficiencies that could hinder growth. A 
higher black market premium is a proxy for greater intervention in the economy by 
the government. The rate of change of terms of trade has a significant positive 
coefficient, and so do the log of population and the initial ratio of investment to gross 
domestic product. Mendoza (1996) predicts that terms of trade variability affects 
growth.  
 
In terms of spillover effects, I find that the weighted average of growth rates of major 
trading partners has a positive impact on the growth rate of a given country. There are 
several alternative ways in which spillover effects may be decomposed. I follow the 
decomposition used in Kelejian et. al. (2003). Spillovers from a country’s neighbors 
are split into two distinct effects; Emanating and Impacting. The Impacting effect is 




country in the presence of spillovers. The Emanating effect arises from the fact that in 
the absence of spillovers, the fundamentals of a country would only have a direct 
impact on the growth rate in that given country; however, in the presence of 
spillovers, there is an additional indirect impact since the fundamentals of a given 
country impact its neighbors’ growth which in turn impacts the growth rate of that 
given country itself. The Emanating effect captures this indirect effect of a county’s 
fundamentals on its growth through the spillover channel. The measure of the 
spillover effect emanating from each country ranges from 0.1% to about 15% in the 
1970s, 0.2% to 18% in the 1980s and 0.2 to 20% in the 1990s. Meanwhile the 
measure of the extent of the spillover impacting each country ranges from 1.6% to 
7% in the 1970s, 1.9% to 7.6% in the 1980s and 2% to 5.4% in the 1990s. Both these 
measures are relative to the effect that would exist in the absence of spillover effects 
(Kelejian, et al, 2003). (Refer to Appendix B for a discussion of how these measures 
are calculated). Table VII presents the impacting and emanating effects of the growth 
spillovers in a few selected countries. 
 
Section 8 – Sensitivity Tests 
 
Table V presents the results of sensitivity tests. The first three columns present results 
when alternate measures of financial development are used. The measure I use in the 
main results - the ratio of credit issued to private firms to gross domestic product - is 
one of the measures used in the King and Levine (1993) study. There are three other 
measures used by the King and Levine study. Column 1 presents results when the size 




ratio of liquid liabilities to Gross Domestic Product, is used to measure financial 
development. This is the traditional measure of financial depth. Column 2 presents 
results when the importance of banks relative to the central bank in allocating 
domestic credit, i.e., the ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit 
money bank domestic assets plus central bank domestic assets, is used to measure 
financial development. This measure helps to indicate the relative importance of 
specific financial institutions. Column 3 presents results when the percentage of credit 
allocated to private firms, i.e., the ratio of claims on the non-financial private sector to 
total domestic credit, is used to measure financial development. This indicator is 
designed to measure domestic asset distribution. The results carry through in two out 
of the three cases and thus seem to be robust to different ways of measuring financial 
development. Capital account openness continues to have a positive impact on 
volatility, i.e., it increases volatility. As before, this effect is ameliorated as the 
economy is more financially developed. 
 
The last two columns contain results with the richest and poorest countries removed 
from the sample. Column 4 removes the top 10% of countries in terms of per capita 
gross domestic product. The differential effect of capital account liberalization carries 
through in this case, though the coefficient of capital account liberalization itself is 
only marginally significant. Column 5 contains results when the bottom 10% of 
countries, in terms of per capita gross domestic product, is removed from the sample. 




Section 9 – Conclusion 
This paper studies the impact of capital account liberalization on the volatility of 
economic growth. I find that there is a significant and robust differential effect of 
liberalizing the capital account based on the level of financial development. I also 
account for possible spillovers of the growth and volatility of major trade partners on 
the domestic economy. I find that there is a significant positive spillover of the 
growth of an economy's major trading partners on a country’s own growth. 
 
The measure of capital account convertibility I use is the International Monetary Fund 
dummy variable. This may not, however, accurately describe the nuances of the laws 
and their implementation in each country's case. Thus it may not be possible to make 
precise policy recommendations in the case of any particular country. All the same, 
based on the empirical results of this paper, there does seem to be a case for a careful 
pace of external financial liberalization, especially in emerging markets with a less 
than well developed financial sector. 
 
Compared to past empirical work (Rodrik 1998, Quinn 1997 and Edwards 2001) that 
concentrated on the influence of capital account openness on economic growth, this 
paper's contribution is to explore another route that capital account liberalization 
could work through, and that is volatility. Rodrik (1998) and Quinn (1997) find 
contradictory results in their empirical investigation of the influence of capital 
account liberalization on growth. Rodrik finds the influence insignificant, while 




helps to reconcile these results somewhat, since even though the direct impact of 
capital account liberalization on growth is insignificant in this paper, the impact on 
volatility depends upon the level of financial development, and in as much as 
volatility has a negative impact on growth, both the Rodrik and Quinn findings can 
coexist in this framework.  
 
Past empirical work on volatility has concentrated on domestic determinants of 
volatility (Denizer, et al (2000), Easterly et al (2000)). Even while considering 
financial development as a determinant, these papers have overlooked important 
factors such as capital account liberalization and international spillover effects. 
Easterly et al find a nonlinear relationship between financial development and 
volatility, and interpret it to mean that while financial development helps reduce 
volatility, this is true only up to a certain point. Beyond this point, further financial 
development might in fact add to volatility. 
 
My results indicate that the impact of financial development on the economy varies 
with the level of openness of the capital account. As long as the economy is 
sufficiently financially developed, it is able to handle volatility that results from 
capital account openness. 
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001) find that both trade and financial linkages are 
important channels of international spillovers that lead to contagion. In this paper I 




easily used to analyze other channels as well. For each channel one would simply 
construct the relevant weighting matrix and add it to the model. 
 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001) conclude that financial links appear to be the most 
important in the propagation of contagion. In this paper I find significant spillovers of 
major trade partners' growth on domestic growth, while the spillover effect of trade 
partners' volatility is insignificant. In this context, considering financial linkages 
would be an interesting exercise. 
 
Even though the evidence presented here by no means closes the issue under scrutiny, 
it does support the conjecture that there is a differential influence of capital account 
convertibility depending on the level of financial development, and this implies that 


















Table I: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Volatility  4.32 3.29 .17 31.73 
Growth 2.23 3.08 -10.78 19.38 
Capital account 
openness 





11.35 26.67 0 168.04 
Financial 
development 
34.10 28.89 1.13 186.71 
Initial GDP per 
capita 
5126.94 7991.10 89.35 45965.61 
Initial inflation 47.25 422.81 -12.05 6836.98 
Initial trade share of 
GDP 
68.45 48.38 3.68 439.03 
WV 2.67 1.02 0 7.41 
Democracy index (0-
1) 
.57 .33 0 1 
Black market 
premium in currency 
exchange 
2.47 1.34 .46 8.76 
Revolutions per year .16 .28 0 2 
Gini coefficient of 
inequality 
41.51 9.94 19.9 65.38 
Rate of  change of 
Terms of Trade 
-.28 3.27 -11.66 25.29 
Standard Deviation 
of rate of  change of 
Terms of Trade 
8.05 11.32 0 93.27 
Log of total 
population 
15.50 1.96 10.62 20.90 
WG 2.79 1.27 0 7.62 
Initial gross 
domestic investment 
(% of GDP) 
22.57 9.29 1.76 82.25 
Secondary education 43.13 31.26 1 130.18 
Standard deviation 
of inflation 
54.35 469.84 0 8633.69 
Diversified exporters .31 .46 0 1 
Dispersion of 
sectoral growth rates 






Table II : Data sources 
 
Variable Source 
Volatility (Standard deviation of growth 
rate of gross domestic product per 
capita) 
World Development Indicators, World 
Bank 
Growth (Growth rate of gross domestic 
product per capita) 
Direction of Trade Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund 
Capital account openness IMF annual reports on exchange 
restrictions 
Financial development (ratio of private 
sector credit to gross domestic product) 
World Development Indicators, World 
Bank 
Financial development (the three other 
measure used in the robustness tests) 
International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund 
Inflation World Development Indicators, World 
Bank 
Initial trade share of GDP World Development Indicators, World 
Bank and Global Development Finance 
Trade weights to calculate the spillover 
matrix 
Direction of Trade Statistics, International 
Monetary Fund  
Democracy index (0-1) Freedom House website 
www.freedomhouse.org/ratings 
Black market premium in currency 
exchange 
Global Development Network Growth 
Database 
Revolutions per year Arthur S. Banks Cross National Time-
Series Data Archive 
Gini coefficient of inequality Lundberg and Squire (2000) 
Rate of change of Terms of Trade Mobarak 2000 
Log of total population World Development Indicators, World 
Bank 
Initial gross domestic investment (% of 
GDP) 
World Development Indicators, World 
Bank 
Secondary education World Development Indicators, World 
Bank and 
Global Development Finance 
Dummy for diversified exporters Global Development Network Growth 
Database 
Dispersion of sectoral growth rates World Development Indicators, World 










Table III: Expected coefficient signs 
 Volatility Growth Financial Development 
Volatility   -  
Growth +or-  + 
Capital account openness + +or- + 
Capital account openness 
X Financial development 
-   
Financial development - +  
Initial GDP per 
capita/1000 - 
- + 
Initial inflation +or- +or- +or- 
Initial trade share of GDP +or- +or- +or- 
WV +   
Democracy index (0-1) - - +or- 
Black market premium in 
currency exchange + 
- +or- 
Revolutions per year + - - 
Gini coefficient of 
inequality + 
+or- +or- 
Rate of  change of Terms 
of Trade 
+ + +or- 
Standard Deviation of rate 
of  change of Terms of 
Trade 
+ - +or- 
Log of total population - +or- +or- 
WG  +  
Initial gross domestic 
investment (% of GDP)  
+  
Secondary education  +  
Standard deviation of 
inflation + 
- +or- 
Diversified exporters -   
Lagged financial 
development 
  + 
Dispersion of sectoral 
growth rates 









Table IV : Results 
 Volatility Growth Financial Development 
Volatility   -.04(-0.32)  
Growth .01(0.07)  4.01(3.94)* 
Capital account openness 2.44(1.97)* -.19(-0.50) 6.61(2.14)* 
Capital account openness 
X Financial development -.05(-2.18)*   
Financial development .03(2.59)* .01(0.78)  
Initial GDP per 
capita/1000 .007(0.19) -.07(-2.11)* .71(3.05)* 
Initial inflation -.001(-1.64) .0002(0.50) .0005(0.13) 
Initial trade share of GDP -.004(-0.62) -0.00003(-0.00) .05(1.15) 
WV -.28(-1.22)   
Democracy index (0-1) -1.36 
(-2.20)* -1.17(-1.97)* -3.20(-0.72) 
Black market premium in 
currency exchange 0.18(1.12) -.29(-2.29)* -.21(-0.19) 
Revolutions per year .84(1.52) -.53(-1.07) -.01(-0.00) 
Gini coefficient  of 
inequality .03(1.69) .03(-1.55) .39(2.80)* 
Rate of  change of Terms 
of Trade .05(0.74) .20(3.90)* -.49(-1.03) 
Standard Deviation of rate 
of  change of Terms of 
Trade 
.04(2.45)* -.002(-0.14) -.14(-1.07) 
Log of total population -.41(-2.46)* .31(2.11)* 2.22(1.87) 
WG  .62(2.56)*  
Initial gross domestic 
investment (% of  GDP)  .07(2.90)*  
Secondary education  .01(1.55)  
Standard deviation of 
inflation .002(1.78) -.001(-0.83) .002(0.22) 
Diversified exporters -.47(-1.56)   
Lagged financial 
development   .90(13.85)* 
Dispersion of sectoral 
growth rates   2.53(2.27)* 
Observations 178 
 
Note *= significant at 5% confidence.  








Table V : Robustness Tests 
 
















Growth -.20(-1.27) -.23(-1.39) -.04(-0.29) .12(0.65) -.13(-0.72) 
Capital account 





-.17(-2.80)* -.13(-2.93)* -.06(-1.28) -.12(-2.14)* -.06(-2.76)* 
Financial 




-.73(-2.14) -.71(-1.78) -.49(-1.71) -.51(-1.32) -.43(-1.31) 
Observations 167 136 170 147 164 
 
 
Note *= significant at 5% confidence. ^= significant at 10% confidence. 
 
Different measure fin dev1 is the ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to the 
sum of deposit money bank domestic assets and central bank domestic assets. This is 
the measure of financial development labeled BANK, in the King and Levine (1993) 
analysis. 
 
Different measure fin dev2 is the ratio of M2 to GDP. This is the measure of financial 
development labeled LLY, in the King and Levine (1993) analysis. 
 
Different measure fin dev3 is the ratio of non financial private sector claims to total 
domestic credit. This is the measure of financial development labeled PRIVATE, in 















Table VI : Countries with No Restrictions on the Capital Account Transaction as 
per IMF Classification (1966-1999) 
 
Country Period without Restriction 
Argentina 1968-70, 1994-96 
Australia 1984-95 
Bolivia 1967-81, 1987-99 
Botswana 1966-67, 1998-99 
Canada 1966-95, 1997-99 
Costa Rica 1966-70, 1973-74, 1981-82, 1995-96, 
1998-99 
Denmark 1988-95, 1997-99 
Ecuador 1967-70, 1972-93, 1995 
Fiji 1966-70 
The Gambia 1968, 1992-96 
Guatemala 1974-80, 1990-99 
Honduras 1967-80 
Hong Kong 1967-99 
Indonesia 1970-96 




Nicaragua 1967-78, 1997-99 
Niger 1996 
Panama 1967-1996, 1998-1999 
Paraguay 1983-84, 1997-99 
Peru 1966-69, 1979-84, 1994-99 
Seychelles 1966-96, 1998-99 
Singapore 1979-96 
Switzerland 1966-99 
Togo 1967, 1995 
United Kingdom 1979-99 
United States 1966-99 
Uruguay 1966-67, 1979-93, 1997-99 










Table VII : Estimates of Spillover Effects of Trade Partners’ Growth for a few 
Selected Countries : Emanating Effects 
 
 1970 1980 1990 
Countries Spillover Effects 
Emanating from 
each country (EM)  
(% age points) 
Spillover Effects 
Emanating from each 
country (EM)  
(% age points) 
Spillover Effects 
Emanating from each 
country (EM)  
(% age points) 
Argentina 0.8 0.5 1.7 
Australia 1.9 1.8 1.9 
Brazil 1.2 1.2 2.1 




0.1 0.5 0.2 
Denmark 1.5 1.0 1.0 
India 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Turkey 0.2 0.4 0.5 
United 
Kingdom 
5.5 6.1 4.6 
United 
States 


























Table VIII : Estimates of Spillover Effects of Trade Partners’ Growth for a few 
Selected Countries : Impacting Effects 
 
 
 1970 1980 1990 
Countries Spillover Effects 
Impacting each 
country (EM)  
(% age points) 
Spillover Effects 
Impacting each country 
(EM)  
(% age points) 
Spillover Effects 
Impacting each 
country (EM)  
(% age points) 
Argentina 3.1 2.8 3.1 
Australia 3.2 3.3 3.1 
Brazil 3.1 3.0 3.0 




7.0 7.6 4.5 
Denmark 3.5 3.5 3.1 
India 2.9 2.9 2.7 
Turkey 3.0 2.9 2.9 
United 
Kingdom 
3.0 3.2 2.8 
United 
States 
























Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization and the Extensive Margin 
 
Section 1 - Introduction 
Tariffs, quotas and other instruments of protection restrict free trade. Trade 
liberalization refers to the process of removal of these barriers. This usually leads to 
considerable increase in the trade of the liberalizing country. Studies of episodes of 
trade liberalization have yielded evidence of a relatively larger expansion of trade at 
the extensive margin. Thus while there is also an increase in the existing trade of the 
country, goods not traded before (‘new’ goods) often account for the largest share of 
the increase in trade. Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) is one such study that documents this 
pattern in liberalizing countries. They examine the bilateral trade patterns of countries 
in North America and Europe that were involved in significant trade liberalization. 
They find considerable overall increase in trade after liberalization. Further they 
distinguish between two categories of trade growth between countries, the extensive 
and the intensive margin. Growth in the intensive margin refers to growth in trade in 
goods that were already being traded before liberalization was undertaken, while 
growth in the extensive margin is growth in trade in goods that had not previously 
been traded. The comparison of the two rates of growth yields interesting results. 
They find evidence of significantly larger growth in the extensive margin following 
the lowering of trade barriers compared to the growth in the intensive margin. When 
they divide goods into categories based on the size of trade conducted in them before 




liberalization accounted for a disproportionately large share in trade following the 
reduction of trade barriers. 
 
These findings have important implications for calculations of the loss from tariffs. It 
appears that the true cost of not liberalizing trade may actually be considerably larger 
than just the deadweight loss of tariffs in existing markets. If the latter constituted the 
full extent of the loss then we would have to assume that all goods that could have 
potentially existed in the market with free trade actually do exist. However it would 
be unrealistic to make such an assumption since the data seem to indicate that trade 
liberalization increases not just existing trade but also leads to trade in goods not 
traded at all before. The true cost would therefore also include the large negative 
welfare effects that result from the disappearance of goods due to trade restrictions. 
These losses would tend to be larger since entire markets disappear, making society 
lose the entire amount of welfare that could be generated in them. Romer (1994) 
makes this point using a partial equilibrium model. He models a developing economy 
where differentiated inputs are available from abroad. Each foreign exporter of a 
differentiated input has a different fixed cost of entering the developing economy’s 
market. Trade restrictions, such as tariffs, prevent some of these exporters from 
entering if they have a higher cost of entry. He estimates welfare losses resulting from 
such trade restrictions that cause a wedge between the range of productive inputs that 
are available in a developing country and the range of productive inputs that could be 
put to use there. In the literature, this aspect of the cost of trade restrictions has been 




and therefore the set of goods available in the economy is assumed to be constant 
before and after trade liberalization. In his paper Romer shows that in a typical 
economic model that implicitly assumes that the set of goods in an economy never 
changes, the predicted efficiency loss from a tariff is small, on the order of the square 
of the tariff rate. However once he allows for the possibility that international trade 
can bring new goods into an economy, this loss can be as much as two times the tariff 
rate. 
 
The particular model that Romer uses is highly simplified (Panagariya, 2002) and one 
of the contributions of this paper is to extend Romer’s analysis to a more 
conventional general equilibrium model and study the impact in the market for 
consumer goods.  
 
The Indian trade liberalization of the 1990s is an instructive case in this context. 
While some trade liberalization was undertaken in India since as far back as the 1970s 
and early 1980s, there was acceleration in the pace of this process only in the late 
1980s. Even then the basic policy mindset, that tended to regard trade liberalization 
with considerable suspicion, underwent a true change only in the 1990s (Panagariya, 
2001). Thus while trade liberalization had been undertaken only on an ad-hoc basis 
before, it was undertaken systematically in the 1990s. A perusal of data from the 
Indian trade liberalization of the early 1990s lends support to Romer's hypothesis. A 
comparison of the rates of growth in the intensive and extensive margins of trade 




liberalization of trade policy. In fact the strongest growth of trade occurred in new 
goods, outpacing outpaced the growth in goods that were traded before the 
liberalization. It is also instructive to note the categories (for example by SITC 
classification) to which the new goods belong. Romer's model is set up in a way that 
only allows for inputs to be new goods. Analysis of the categories into which the new 
goods fell in the Indian case reveals that the new goods were well dispersed as far as 
the SITC classification goes. Thus it would seem that while inputs did constitute a 
part of the extensive margin of growth of trade in India, some of the new goods 
belonged to other categories – such as consumer goods – as well. 
  
This paper extends the Romer (1994) partial model framework to a general 
equilibrium framework. Also, given that the data indicate that the growth in the 
extensive margin seems to be well dispersed among  different categories of goods, 
this paper considers the impact of entry of new consumer goods. The aim is to 
calculate the total cost of trade protection, both from the deadweight loss of the tariff 
in existing markets and from the disappearance of consumer goods due to tariffs. My 
model is a symmetric two-country model. I start with free trade and then consider 
imposing equal  tariffs in both countries. Thus terms of trade remain unchanged. In 
this model the two countries trade in differentiated goods; there is thus monopolistic 
competition. I assume that the firms that produce these differentiated goods are 
heterogeneous in the level of the fixed cost they face to enter an export market. 
Without tariffs there are firms on the margin that are able to just break even when 




could be eliminated from the foreign market even if the tariff imposed is very small. 
The heterogeneity of firms based on fixed cost differences plays an important role in 
determining the cost of protection in terms of loss of welfare from the disappearance 
of goods due to trade restrictions. This is because it is the fixed cost differences that 
determines who gets to enter the foreign market and who does not. Thus it divides 
firms into those that supply only to the domestic market and those that also sell 
abroad. An important result of my model is that the exporting firms are characterized 
by higher productivity than those that supply their output exclusively in the domestic 
market. This is similar to the implication of the models by Melitz (2003) and 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2002), although my model generates this characteristic 
using different assumptions. 
 
I now compare my model and assumptions to those of Melitz (2003) and Helpman, 
Melitz and Yeaple (2002). In these papers the authors assume that each firm's 
productivity is drawn from a distribution, and based on this productivity the firm 
either exits or decides to produce. If it decides to produce, it can either supply only to 
the domestic market or to both the domestic and the foreign market. These models 
conclude that only the most productive firms choose to participate in the international 
market. Thus the assumption of heterogeneous marginal cost drives the results in 
these models. My model is based on a different assumption and one that is quite 
plausible in the context of the real world. I make the assumption that different firms 
have different fixed costs of entry into a foreign market. Since the products that they 




order to set up shop in a foreign market would be different. For instance, the costs of 
gaining knowledge of the local market or of setting up a supply chain, etc, would be 
different depending on the logistics of the market for that product. It is thus the 
heterogeneity in the fixed cost of entry that drives the results in my model. I arrive at 
the same structure of the industry as the aforementioned papers, where the most 
productive firms get to participate internationally, though I use a different and 
arguably more plausible basis of firm heterogeneity. This form of firm heterogeneity 
is also assumed in Romer (1994).  
 
The final step of the analysis is to calculate the cost of trade protection. In order to 
present a clear contrast to the results that would be obtained if only the deadweight 
loss in existing markets was considered, I calculate the cost of trade protection under 
two different sets of assumptions. First I assume, as is the common practice in such 
studies, that there is no change in the set of goods available in the economy after trade 
liberalization. Thus the number of entrants into the foreign market is held constant at 
the free trade level and the cost of protection arises solely from the deadweight loss of 
tariffs. The second set of calculations allows the number of entrants, and therefore the 
set of available goods in the economy, to vary with the level of protection. The 
welfare costs are consistently higher under the latter scenario. This is true especially 






Section 2 - The Case of the Indian Trade Liberalization 
The hypothesis that tariff reductions can lead to an increase in the extensive margin of 
trade can be put to test if one can find a case of trade liberalization that occurred 
using tariff reduction as the sole instrument of liberalization. Usually, however, a 
whole gamut of trade policy instruments is changed together in the process of 
liberalization. So, for instance, in the case of the Indian trade liberalization of the 
1990s, the liberalization process involved both significant tariff reduction (the highest 
rate fell from 355 to 40 percent) and substantial breaking down of non-tariff barriers 
such as a reduction in the proportion of imports subject to licensing. All the same a 
closer and more detailed look at the data of Indian trade is useful, since it 
demonstrates at least that most of the growth in trade that resulted from the 
liberalization process was on the extensive margin.  Before this period of reform and 
liberalization India was an extremely protected economy; during 1985-90, the 
average annual trade to GDP ratio was only 5%  (Panagariya, 1998). The program of 
economic reform that was initiated in 1991 was of significant proportions, and as part 
of this program a considerable amount of trade reform took place within a span of a 
few years. This provides a good study of the impact of trade liberalization on the 
growth of trade on the extensive and the intensive margin in the context of a 
developing country. It is also useful in pinning down parameter values for the model 
developed in this paper. 
 
In order to analyze the trade data to determine the growth in trade at the extensive 




these margins. The methodology of creating these categories is borrowed from Kehoe 
and Ruhl (2002). Goods that were not traded at all or traded in very small quantities 
are lumped together in the first category. The rest of the goods are arranged into 
categories based on the value of trade. The growth of trade in these categories is then 
tracked as the trade liberalization process continues. 
 
This methodology tracks the evolution of trade (imports and exports) in India starting 
from 1988 and going to up to 1999. Thus the analysis starts approximately three years 
before the launching of the major economic reforms program in 1991 and continues 
for eight years afterwards. 
  
I now describe the procedure that I use to analyze the growth in the extensive and 
intensive margin of trade in India. The goods are defined by their SITC classification 
(Revision 3). The goods are arranged in ascending order of the magnitude of trade. 
They are then divided into 10 groups, each constituting approximately 10% of trade 
in the first year of the sample, i.e., 1988. The groups are constructed such that the first 
group includes those goods that were not traded at all in 1988, as well as goods with a 
small amount of trade. I keep adding to this group till the trade share of this category 
reaches 10% of total trade. The last group, therefore, consists of the most heavily 
traded goods in the year 1988. Therefore, while the first group had the largest number 
of SITC categories in it, the successive groups had a smaller and smaller number of 
SITC categories, and the last group had the fewest number of SITC categories adding 




categories is very large. This exercise was undertaken in the exact same way for 
exports and imports separately. 
 
Table IX presents this analysis for imports of India starting in 1988 and going through 
to 1999. The first group that constituted 10% of imports in 1988 consisted of 2312 
SITC categories of goods. This group contained all of the new goods, i.e. the 
extensive margin of India’s import trade, and those goods that were traded in the 
smallest amounts in 1988. The extensive margin consists of those goods that were 
imported for the first time after this initial year of the sample. It is interesting to note 
that it is this group of imports that showed the maximum growth among all of the 
import groups. Also there is a definite spurt in this growth in the post 1991 trade 
liberalization period. By the end of the sample period, the share of this group in trade 
had grown from 10% in 1988 to 35% in 1999. While some of the increase in trade 
probably occurred in the natural process of economic development of India, the 
timing and composition of the growth in trade is suggestive. Specifically the timing of 
the growth coincides quite neatly with the major push in trade liberalization that 
occurred in the early 1990s, suggesting that liberalization policy measures had an 
important role in the growth in trade. The composition of the growth is skewed 
towards goods that were either not traded before (the extensive margin) or goods that 
were traded very little, supporting Romer’s hypothesis that trade restrictions can lead 
to complete disappearance of certain goods. As is evident in the Indian case, 




world.  The share of all the other groups was either stable or declined during the same 
time period.  
 
Table X presents this analysis for exports of India during the same time period. The 
first group of goods, including the entire extensive margin of exports, includes 2533 
SITC categories of goods. The share of this group grows from 10% in 1988 to 27% in 
1999. Again the Romer (1994) hypothesis and the findings of Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) 
are supported in these results. 
 
It is interesting to look deeper into exactly what the extensive margin of imports 
consisted of. I analyze the goods that were part of the extensive margin in detail. 
Table XI lists the total number under each broad division of the Standard 
International Trade Classification, and also the number of goods in each category that 
were newly imported into India after 1988 and thus constituted the extensive margin. 
It appears that new goods are widely distributed among the SITC categories and are 
not concentrated in any particular group of goods. 
 
Section 3 - The Model 
The aim of this model is to evaluate the impact of tariffs on the number of foreign 
entrants into the domestic economy. Once this impact is established, the next step is 
to compare the costs of protection in terms of lost utility, in the case where the 
number of foreign entrants is held constant versus the case where this number is 





I assume a very simplified world economy consisting of two symmetric countries. 
There are iM +1 sectors of production in each country where i=1,2 for country 1 and 
country 2. One sector in each country produces a homogeneous product while the rest 
of the sectors produce differentiated products. The homogenous product is assumed to 
be identical in both countries. This assumption helps us to get equal wages in both 
countries with trade. 
 
The utility function of consumers in each country is identical, and is given, for 









xHU αββα    (1) 
where ix  is consumption of the differentiated good produced by sector i; H is the 
consumption of the homogeneous good; 11 +N  is the total number varieties of goods 
available in Country 1, and 1N  is the sum of the number of varieties of the 
differentiated good that are produced domestically and those that are imported from 
abroad, i.e., 211 EMMN +=  where 
1M is the number of domestically produced 
varieties in Country 1 and 2EM  is the number of varieties that are exported into 
country 1 by producers from country 2. As will become evident, not all producers are 
able to supply to the foreign market. 
 
The utility function of consumers, as given by equation (1), is such that each 
consumer spends a fraction α  of income on differentiated products and a fraction (1-




utility function yields preferences over varieties of product x that have the standard 









The particular form of the utility function assumed in this model implies that people 
prefer more variety to less. For a given level of spending on differentiated products, 
and a given price for the available varieties, consumer welfare increases as the 
number of varieties becomes larger (Helpman and Krugman, 1985).  
 
We solve the consumers’ problem next. We maximize the utility function of the 
consumer subject to the budget constraint. Assume that E is the aggregate spending in 
the country. Let E include government tariff revenues as well, since we assume that 
all government revenues are refunded to the public in lump-sum. The Lagrangian 












− λαββα  
where λ  is the lagrangian multiplier, np  is the price of the nth variety of x and Hp  is 
the price of the homogeneous good, is assumed to equal 1 since H is the numeraire. 
 
 After simplification, the first order condition with respect to nx yields the following: 
σσ
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is taken as given by each firm. 
 


































Country 1 is endowed with 1L  units of labor. The homogeneous product is produced 
in both countries and wages are equalized. The homogeneous product is produced 
with one unit of labor per unit of its output. Thus the common wage rate equals one. 
By symmetry, the total number of differentiated products sold in both countries is 
equal and so are the number of domestic suppliers and exporters. Thus 21 NN = , 
21 MM =  and 21 EE MM = .  
 
Each firm bears a fixed cost of entry into the domestic market. This cost is measured 
in labor units and is denoted by F. The marginal cost of production is θ . As in Romer 
(1994), we choose the units for measuring quantities of all the differentiated goods so 
that θ , the marginal cost of one additional unit of each good, is the same for all 
goods. Given this structure of the cost of production, each firm produces a unique 
differentiated product. All firms supply in their respective domestic market. If a firm 
also chooses to enter the foreign market, it bears an additional fixed cost. This fixed 
cost of entering the foreign market is denoted by )(kµ . Here the index k is defined as 
k= 1, 2, …, 1M . The goods are arranged so that µ  is increasing in k. For simplicity, 
we assume that this dependence is linear: )(kµ  = kµ . Thus the domestic producers in 
each of the two countries are arranged in increasing order of their fixed cost of 
entering the foreign market. Firms are therefore heterogeneous based on the 
differences in their fixed cost of exporting. 
 
Each firm chooses to export if the ex-post monopoly revenue it can extract is greater 




differentiated product that are exported from country 2 into country 1. Each of these 
exported varieties is produced by one particular firm in country 2. These firms differ 
in their fixed cost of exporting to country 1. Assuming that they are arranged in 
ascending order of this fixed cost, the last good that is able to afford to enter the 
market of country 1 is good 2EM .  For this marginal good entry costs just equal ex-
post monopoly revenue and thus, this firm earns exactly zero profit. For all firms that 
choose to export, the profits that are made in export market are positive and only the 
marginal entrant earns exactly zero profit. 
 
Thus the firms in each of the two symmetric countries can be divided into two 
categories. One category of producers choose to supply both in their domestic market 
as well as in the foreign market as exporters. This category of producers is able to 
make profits in their export market by extracting a monopoly revenue that is greater 
than their fixed cost of entering the export market, )(kµ . The second category 
consists of those producers that choose to supply their output only in their domestic 
market. These producers’ fixed cost of exporting is so high that they are unable to 
break even in the export market.  
 
Thus those domestic firms that earn negative profits from entering the foreign market, 
choose to supply only in the domestic market. The profit maximizing problem of each 
of the domestic suppliers is of the following form, 
DDDD
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where Dp  is the price and Dx  is the quantity of a variety that’s produced and sold 
domestically. Recall that we have assumed preferences of the form that yield constant 
elasticity of demand and a cost structure that consists of constant marginal cost of 
production. These two assumptions together ensure that all varieties that are produced 
and sold domestically have the same price. Solving the above maximization, the price 
of all domestically produced varieties is, 
β
θ=Dp . As a result of free entry of firms, 
all domestic firms that supply only in the domestic market earn exactly zero profits. 
 
Those firms in each country that earn non-negative profits in the export market 
supply both in the domestic as well as the foreign market. In order to study the 
maximization problem that these firms solve let us first suppose that the government 
in both countries imposes an ad-valorem tax or tariff, τ  on all purchases of goods 
imported from abroad.  
 
Firms that operate both in their domestic market and in the foreign market face a 
profit maximization problem of the form, 
FFFFDDDD
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The solution of this problem gives us the price at which all imported goods will be 
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 . Imported goods therefore are more expensive than 





As mentioned above, the operating profit from serving the domestic market is driven 
to zero for all firms that produce and supply in the domestic economy. Thus, 
Fxxpx DDDD =−θ)(      (10) 
We substitute in equation (10) the expression for Dp  that we obtained earlier from 
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Next we solve for Fx , the equilibrium quantity imported of each variety. We do this 
by equating the marginal rate of substitution between foreign and domestic goods to 
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We substitute the expression for Dp and Fp that we obtained earlier from the solution 
of the profit maximization problem of the suppliers of the differentiated goods. Also 
we substitute the expression for Dx that we obtained in (11) above. Solving (12) for 














As mentioned before all exporters will earn non-negative profits in the export market. 
While constant elasticity of substitution in preferences and constant marginal cost of 
production imply that the price charged for each variety of exports is exactly the 
same, the fixed cost of entering the export market is different for each firm. As a 
result all exporters that choose to enter the foreign market  except for the marginal 
exporter who earns exactly zero profits. 
 
The marginal exporter from country 2 supplies the good denoted by 2EM , and we can 
write its zero profit condition as 
FFF
E xxxpM θτµ −−= )()1(
2      (14) 
where the left hand side denotes the fixed cost of entering the foreign market for the 
exporter of good 2EM . Substituting the expressions for the price of imports and their 
equilibrium quantity from (13) above, we can solve for the total number of country 2 
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The number of firms in each country that choose to supply to the foreign market is a 
function of F, the fixed cost of domestic production; τ , the advalorem tariff rate; µ , 
which affects the fixed cost of entering the foreign market; and β . Equation (15) 
allows us to study the impact of imposing tariffs on the number of foreign entrants 








to when 0>τ . Thus even a tiny tariff has the impact of making some goods 
disappear from the domestic market, as it reduces the number of foreign firms that are 
able to enter the domestic market profitably. 
 
The usual assumption in calculating the loss from government intervention in the 
form of taxes and tariffs is that the number of varieties of goods remains unaffected 
by such policy. The deadweight loss of tariffs in existing markets is thus considered 
the only loss. However, it is quite plausible that in the context of the international 
economy, imposition of tariffs may lead to some producers being thrown out of 
foreign markets. In the context of the current model, if tariffs are raised, the number 
of foreign producers that can profitably export is reduced. This, according to Romer 
(1994), can have an especially adverse impact in developing countries, where imports 
are often a source of technological advancement.  So if some goods are not allowed to 
enter a developing country, it is possible that those markets will not exist at all in that 
country, especially if it does not have the technological know-how to produce such 
goods. It is therefore important to account for loss that arises not only from the 
deadweight loss of tariffs in the conventional sense of shrinkage of existing markets, 
but also losses due to nonexistence of markets would otherwise exist. 
 
As in Romer (1994), I compare the welfare loss from the tariff under two situations. 
In the first case the number of foreign entrants into the domestic market is held 
constant. Under this scenario, the tariff is imposed after the fixed cost of entry has 




impacted by the tariff since entry costs are sunk. This mimics the usual economic 
analysis of the cost of trade restrictions, where only the deadweight loss due to 
shrinkage of market size is taken into account. 
 
In the second case, the number of foreign entrants is allowed to depend on the tariffs. 
Under this scenario the tariff is imposed before the entry cost is incurred by the 
foreign firms. Therefore in this case since the fixed entry costs are not yet incurred, 
the tariffs impact the entry decision of firms. Therefore, the number of entrants is 
reduced as a result of the tariff. In this case the cost of protection is higher, since it 
includs not only the conventional deadweight loss, but also the loss of welfare due to 
the disappearance of some imported goods. 
 
We measure the cost in terms of loss of consumer welfare (utility). We use the utility 
function and calculate the percentage change in utility when tariffs are imposed. 
Essentially we compare the situation where tariffs are nonexistent ( 0=τ ) to a 
situation where there are positive tariffs ( 0>τ ). The loss of utility will be exactly the 
same in both countries, given their symmetry.  
 
Consider first the case where the number of foreign entrants is held constant 
irrespective of the tariffs. The percentage loss of utility due to the presence of tariff in 
















In the case where the tariffs are fully anticipated and therefore the number of foreign 
firms that enter a country is allowed to vary with the tariff, the percentage loss of 





U =− τ .       (17) 
 
 
Section 4 - The Welfare Consequences of Tariffs in this Setup 
 
To calculate the consequences for the welfare of a representative consumer in the 
domestic economy we compare utility levels achieved on the one hand with free trade 
and on the other with a tariff. This comparison is made under two scenarios, one 
where the number of foreign participants in the domestic economy remains the same 
after a tariff is imposed and the other where the number of foreign participants that 
enter the domestic economy is allowed to fall to a lower level as compared to the free 
trade scenario. 
 
The costs are in percentage terms, i.e., I calculate the percentage change in the level 
of utility of the representative consumer after the tariff is imposed compared to the 
level of utility achieved without the tariff.  
 
Assuming a tariffτ , equation (15) gives the number of foreign entrants in the 













Now in order to calculate the number of foreign entrants under free trade we set the 
tariff equal to zero, i.e. 0=τ , in equation (15) and get the number of foreign entrants 






Recall that equation (11) yields the expression for the equilibrium output sold by each 
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Again under free trade we set 0=τ  in equation (13) and obtain the equilibrium 
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All costs of production are expressed in terms of labor units. The total labor force in 




in producing output that is sold in the domestic market as well as output that is 
exported. 
 
Hence we can write the following equality for country 1, keeping in mind that a 
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In the above equation, the total labor force is equated to the total cost of production in 
the economy. Thus, the total labor force of country 1 is equated to the total cost of 
domestic production for the domestic market, )(*1 ixFM θ+ , plus the total fixed cost 






kµ , plus the variable cost of 
production for export,  FE xM θ
1 , plus the total production cost of the numeraire 
homogenous good H. 
 
We can use equation (18) to solve for the total number of producers from each 
country, i.e., iM  where i=1, 2 for country 1 and country 2 respectively. This solution 
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In the absence of free trade when tariff is non-zero, i.e., 0>τ  in both countries, there 
arise 2 separate cases. In one case the tariffs are not allowed to impact the number of 
firms that choose to export, the total number of domestic firms in country 1 (and 
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Here the number of domestic firms is calculated assuming that the number of firms 
that choose to export is not impacted by the tariffs. However, note that the optimal 
output of the traded products Fx  changes, since that depends on the level of tariffsτ . 
 
In the second case, when tariffs are non-zero, 0>τ  in both countries and these tariffs 
are allowed to impact the number of firms that choose to export, the total number of 

























Here both the number of firms that choose to export and the optimal output of each 
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Note that N is the total number of varieties available to the consumers in each 
country. Thus N is the sum of the total number of firms and therefore varieties that 
are produced in the domestic economy plus the number of varieties that are imported 
from abroad. Therefore, for instance, in the case of country 1, 111 EMMN += . Recall 
also that due to symmetry, 21 NN =  and 21 MM =   and 21 EE MM = . 
 
Now we are ready to write down the expression for utility under different trade policy 
regimes and different assumptions regarding the impact of imposing tariffs. There are 
3 broad cases. First is the case where there exists free trade, i.e., 0=τ , in both 





D xMxMHU += −   (23) 
 
Second is the case where 0>τ  in both countries, and the number of entrants is held 























Third is the case where 0>τ  in both countries, and the number of entrants is allowed 





D xMxMHU += −   (25) 
 
Thus, for each country the welfare cost of imposing tariffs, assuming tariffs do not 
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Substituting the expressions for utility obtained in equation (23) and (24) in the case 

































Finally, the welfare cost of imposing tariffs assuming that the tariffs do influence the 












Substituting the expressions for utility obtained in equation (23) and equation (25), in 




























Let us first calculate the percentage change in the level of utility in the case where the 
number of foreign firms that choose to enter the domestic market remain the same 
even after the tariff is imposed. The expression for it is given by equation for the cost 
denoted by 1C  above.  
 
A comparison of 1C  and 2C  will reveal the relative magnitude of the costs under the 
assumption of fixed and flexible number of entrants into the domestic market.   
 
Table XII shows the welfare loss, i.e. the cost of protection under the two cases for 
different values of the parameters. In row 'A' the base case is presented. Here the ratio 
of imports to GDP is about 10% with no tarrifs and 5% with the tariffs. This is close 
to the ratios in India after and before the trade liberalization respectively. The tariffs 
are set at 20%, which is approximately the average rate of protection on consumer 
goods in India. In this case, 12 CC > .  
 
Rows B and C show the impact of changing the fixed cost F of setting up production 




the domestic market. As this fixed cost rises (falls), the number of firms in each 
economy falls (rises) and the optimal output supplied by each firm rises (falls). This 
is because a larger output is required in order to break even in the domestic market. 
Since the number of foreign entrants and their optimal output are both directly 
proportional to the domestic fixed cost both increase with the increase in F. Here 
again 12 CC > . 
  
In rows D and E, we examine the impact of changing µ . This parameter affects the 
fixed cost of exporting to a foreign market. An increase (decrease) in µ  leads to 
fewer firms being able to enter the foreign market as the fixed cost of entry becomes 
too high. Therefore here the number of foreign participants in each market decreases 
(increases) and the total number of domestic firms that participate in each market 
increases (decreases).  Yet again we find that, 12 CC > . 
 
Section 5 - Conclusion 
In the traditional analysis of the welfare cost that results from putting barriers to 
trade, the deadweight loss that results from the shrinkage in market size due to tariffs 
is usually the only component included in the calculation. While this analysis is 
entirely valid for markets that continue to exist even after the tariff is imposed, it 
overlooks those markets that may cease to exist due to the trade restrictions. In fact, if 
trade restrictions lead to certain goods not being imported at all, then the cost 




considers the deadweight loss of the tariff in existing markets. Romer (1994) argues 
that the costs of lost markets might be quite significant especially for developing 
countries. In these countries, imports might be desirable both for their own sake and 
also as an important source of technological progress. His analysis concentrates on 
the number of varieties of intermediate goods that were available in an economy, 
before and after trade restrictions were imposed. He finds that the estimates of cost of 
protection were a lot larger when he accounted for downward adjustment in the 
number of foreign entrants into the market. 
 
In this paper I begin with the basic intuition of the Romer model, i.e. the possibility of 
higher costs of protection resulting from disappearance of goods. I analyze trade data 
from the Indian trade liberalization episode of the early 1990s. A significant fraction 
of the 'new' goods that entered the Indian market after the liberalization was 
comprised of consumer goods. I extend the Romer partial equilibrium model that 
accounted for the intermediate goods market to a general equilibrium model that is 
concerned with the market for consumer goods. I analyze the impact of trade 
liberalization on the utility of the representative consumer under two scenarios. The 
first scenario replicates the usual analysis that holds the number of foreign 
participants in the domestic economy constant. The second scenario allows for an 
adjustment of this number. In my model firms are heterogeneous based on the fixed 
cost that they pay to export to a foreign market. When I allow the number of foreign 
participants to change in response to trade restrictions, the marginal foreign firms that 




find that in almost all cases the cost of protection calculations that allow for 
adjustment in the number of foreign participants produce higher estimates of this cost 
than calculations that assume that the number of foreign entrants is constant. 
 
The implications of the model also echo the real life example of India's 'natural 
experiment' of considerable trade liberalization in a developing country in a relatively 
short span of time. New goods were an important source of the resulting growth in 
trade. This trend of a significant change in the number of foreign participants in the 
domestic economy appears to be an important one and the analysis in this paper 





Table IX : Evolution of Imports 
 
 
The tables below present the evolution of the share of imports in total imports, by 
groups that constitute approximately 10% share each in 1988. 
The groups are constructed such that the first category contains the least traded SITC 
classifications and the last category contains the most traded ones. 
 
Share of total imports (% of total imports)*: 
 
# of SITC 
categories 
included 
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
2312 10 13 15 15 17 20 28 26 28 32 38 35 
211 10 10 11 9 9 11 11 11 11 11 9 10 
97 10 10 11 10 11 13 13 14 12 11 10 8 
49 10 9 9 8 8 7 7 7 6 5 5 4 
29 10 8 9 9 8 8 9 9 8 7 6 6 
19 10 9 9 8 7 6 5 5 4 5 3 2 
13 10 8 7 6 5 5 7 8 8 7 8 8 
8 10 12 11 10 9 6 6 6 5 5 3 6 
3 20 21 18 25 26 24 14 14 18 17 18 21 
 
 
*SITC (Revision 3) categories 66721 and 66722 have been clubbed together into one 
category for the above analysis, since there appears to have been a reclassification away from 








Table X : Evolution of Exports 
 
 
The table below presents the evolution of the share of exports in total exports, by 
groups that constitute approximately 10% share each in the first year of my sample, 
1988. 
 
The groups are constructed such that the first category contains the least traded SITC 
classifications and the last category contains the most traded ones. 
 
Share of total exports (% of total exports): 
 
# of SITC 
categories 
included 
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
2533 10 13 14 18 20 22 23 24 26 27 25 27 
132 10 10 11 10 10 11 11 12 12 12 12 11 
52 10 11 10 11 11 8 9 7 8 8 7 8 
23 10 10 11 10 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
11 10 10 10 11 10 11 11 11 12 12 11 10 
7 10 11 11 10 11 10 9 8 9 8 8 7 
5 11 9 10 11 10 10 11 12 10 10 11 8 
1 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 











Table XI : The New Goods 
 
The table below presents the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC 
Revision-3) categories of the 'new goods' that started being imported by India after its 
trade liberalization. 
SITC : Revision 3 









that fall into 
this division. 
0. Food and Live Animals    
Live animals other than animals of division 
03 
00 11 6 
Meat and meat preparations 01 38 12 
Dairy products and birds’ eggs 02 22 6 
Fish (not marine mammals), crustaceans, 
mollusks and aquatic invertebrates and 
preparations thereof 
03 47 21 
Cereals and cereal preparations 04 34 7 
Vegetables and fruit. 05 96 49 
Sugars, sugar preparations and honey 06 17 5 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and 
manufactures thereof 
07 35 13 
Feeding stuff for animals (not included 
unmilled cereals) 
08 26 13 
Miscellaneous edible products and 
preparations 
09 18 5 
1. Beverages and Tobacco    
Beverages 11 14 2 
Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 12 8 1 
2. Crude Materials, Inedible, Except Fuels    
Hides, skins, and furskins, raw 21 18 2 
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 22 15 2 
Crude rubber (including synthetic and 
reclaimed) 
23 16 0 
Cork and wood 24 18 3 
Pulp and waste paper 25 14 0 
Textile fibres (other than wool tops and 
other combed wool) and their wastes (not 
manufactured into yarn or fabric) 







SITC : Revision 3 









that fall into 
this division. 
Crude fertilizers, other than those of 
division 56, and crude minerals (excluding 
coal, petroleum and precious stones) 
27 48 3 
Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 28 44 3 
Crude animal and vegetable materials, 
n.e.s. 
29 37 8 
3. Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related 
Materials  
   
Coal, coke and briquettes 32 7 0 
Petroleum, petroleum products and related 
materials 
33 21 3 
Gas, natural and manufactured 34 8 0 
Electric current 35 1 0 
4. Animal and Vegetable Oils, Fats and 
Waxes 
   
Animal oils and fats 41 10 4 
Fixed vegetables fats and oils, crude, 
refined or fractionated 
42 27 5 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils, 
processed; waxes of animal or vegetable 
fats and oils, n.e.s.  
43 7 0 
5. Chemicals and Related Products    
Organic chemicals 51 125 1 
Inorganic chemicals 52 84 1 
Dyeing, tanning and coloring materials 53 33 0 
Medical and pharmaceutical products 54 45 1 
Essential oils and resinoids and perfume 
materials; toilet, polishing and cleaning 
preparations 
55 26 2 
Fertilizers (other than those of group 272) 56 21 5 
Plastics in primary forms 57 54 0 
Plastics in non-primary forms 58 23 0 
Chemical materials and products, n.e.s. 59 63 5 
6. Manufactured Goods classified chiefly 
by materials  
   
Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s and 
dressed furskins 
61 22 1 
Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. 62 31 2 
Cork and wood manufactures (excluding 
furniture) 





SITC : Revision 3 
Description of section 
Division Code Total number of 
categories in the 
division. 
Number of new 
imports that fall 
into this division. 
Paper, paperboard and 
articles of paper pulp, 
of paper or of 
paperboard 
64 72 2 
Textile yarn, fabrics, 
made-up articles, 
n.e.s., and related 
products 
65 222 33 
Non-metallic mineral 
manufactures, n.e.s. 
66 95 11 
Iron and steel 67 166 0 
Non-ferrous metals 68 71 1 
Manufactures of 
metals, n.e.s. 
69 119 5 
7. Machinery and 
Transport Equipment 








72 116 4 
Metal working 
machinery 
73 70 0 
General industrial 
machinery and 
equipment, n.e.s. and 
machine parts, n.e.s. 
74 151 1 
Office machines and 
automatic data 
processing machines 
75 30 1 
Telecommunications 
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Description of 
section 
Division Code Total number of 
categories in the 
division. 
Number of new 
imports that fall 













78 41 8 
Other transport 
equipment 









fixtures and fittings, 
n.e.s. 
81 17 0 




and similar stuffed 
furnishings 




83 9 8 
Articles of apparel 
and clothing 
accessories 
84 96 70 













SITC : Revision 3 
Description of 
section 
Division Code Total number of 
categories in the 
division. 
Number of new 
imports that fall 




supplies and optical 
goods, n.e.s.; 
watches and clocks 




89 152 34 




   
Postal packages not 
classified according 
to kind 




according to kind 
93 1 0 
Coin (other than 
gold coin) not being 
legal tender 

























Table XII : Comparison of Costs. 
 
Row Parameters* Costs** 
A. F=1000, α =0.5, µ =0.05, L=1 billion, 
θ =0.01, τ =0.2, β =0.5 
1C = 0.0016 
2C = 0.0035  
B. F=100, α =0.5, µ =0.05, L=1 billion, 
θ =0.01, τ =0.2, β =0.5 
1C = 0.000016 
2C = 0.000036  
C. F=2000, α =0.5, µ =0.05, L=1 billion, 
θ =0.01, τ =0.2, β =0.5 
1C = 0.006 
2C = 0.013  
D. F=1000, α =0.5, µ =0.005, L=1 billion, 
θ =0.01, τ =0.2, β =0.5 
1C = 0.013 
2C = 0.030  
E. F=1000, α =0.5, µ =5, L=1 billion, 
θ =0.01, τ =0.2, β =0.5 
1C = 0.000016 
2C = 0.000036  
 
* 
F - fixed cost of setting up production in the domestic market 
α  - the share of income spent on differentiated goods. 
µ  - µ k is the fixed cost of exporting to the foreign market, k=1,2,…N 
L - size of the labor force 
θ  - marginal Cost of producing one unit of the differentiated good 
τ  - advalorem rate of tariff 








1C - cost of protection when number of exporters is held constant. 
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Appendix A - Instruments for ttVW and ttGW  
The single equation example, outlined below helps to illustrate why ttVW and 
ttGW are endogenous and what the appropriate instruments for them are. 






assume that the roots of Wλ  are all less than 1 in absolute value. WY measures the 
spatial lag term that measures the spillover effect. W is the weighting matrix. In my 
model, the sum of the rows of the weighting matrix are less than or equal to 1 since 









WY is endogenous because 
0)(])[( 1 ≠Ω−=′ − ελε WIWWYE   




















Therefore the potential instruments for WY are XWXWXWWXX m,...,,,, 32 . I take 
m=1 in my estimation. Thus, the set of instruments that I can potentially use for the 
endogenous variables in the system are the vectors, X and WX. 
Appendix B - Emanating and Impacting Spillover Effects 
Consider the model 
ελβ ++= WYXY   
















Let ijg be the i,j-th element of 


























Following Kelejian et al., 2003, there are two interesting impacts that can be 
measured with respect to the spillover effect : 
1. The impact that feeds back into country i due to the fact that its influence on other 
countries, through the spillover term, in turn influences it. Thus iig  will typically be 
greater than 1 for any country i. The measure of this feedback effect (emanating 




)1(100 −= iii gEM  
This measure gives an estimate of the impact of a unit change in iX (any of the 
exogenous explanatory variables in country i) on the expected value of iY relative to 
the impact that would've existed in the absence of spillovers. 
2. The average spillover impact of a country's neighbours is called the impacting 










where the N is the number of neighbours whose average impact is being measured. 
This measure gives an estimate of the impact of a unit change in jX (any of the 
exogenous explanatory variables in country j) on the expected value of iY relative to 
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